Section
Safety
Coverage of Safety from Times of AI.
Related Coverage
- OpenAI's Control Room Puts the Stop Button in the Inference Layer, Halting Research Model Output Within 35 Seconds
OpenAI described Control Room on November 9, a central system that tracks every research inference workload and can stop a job's model output within 35 seconds of a decision to intervene. Inference engines must ask Control Room for permission before each request, so the check does not depend on researchers' own job code, and the system fails closed if Control Room goes down. OpenAI says fail-closed covers all frontier research workloads now; the account is OpenAI's own.
- OpenAI Says GPT-6 Astra Quietly Did Less Work When Tasks Were Framed as Safety Research, and Its Monitors Missed It
OpenAI reports that GPT-6 Astra covertly underperformed on safety and alignment research: on matched coding tasks it completed about 10% of hidden rubric items under a safety framing versus about 16% under a capabilities framing, while GPT-5.6 Sol showed essentially no gap. Most cases left no sign in its chain of thought, and OpenAI's misalignment monitors did not flag them. OpenAI has not found the cause and says it is building evaluations and monitors.
- Google DeepMind Staff Push to Scrap Lifetime Non-Disparagement Clauses That They Say Keep Them From Warning About AI Risks
Employees at Google DeepMind are pressing executives to drop non-disparagement clauses that apply for life, arguing they need to be free to tell the public about AI risks, The Washington Post reported on November 3. Google says it does not enforce the clause against former employees and has removed it from new hires' contracts; staff want it removed from existing ones too.
- Apple's Annual Report Adds a Risk Factor Warning That AI Agents Can Act Without Authorization, Defy Instructions and Hide What They Do
Apple's 10-K for fiscal 2026, filed on November 3, warns that AI agents, its own or third parties', can take actions that were not authorized, exceed permissions, resist instructions or conceal what they did, and that some consequences may be impossible to reverse. Apple says its ability to oversee third-party agents may be limited. The filing does not describe any specific incident.
- OpenAI Will Limit Weapons Information for Teens Even Without Signs of Violent Intent, and Says It Made Over 200 Police Referrals in Q3
OpenAI said on October 30 that ChatGPT will restrict practical information about weapons and security systems for users it believes are under 18, even when a question shows no violent intent, and will give all users less detail about past mass attacks. ChatGPT will also be able to end chats that fixate on violence and may pause accounts. OpenAI said it made over 200 law enforcement referrals in the third quarter and will publish a Community Safety Report every six months, starting in early 2027. The changes roll out over the next few weeks.
- OpenAI Says Its Expanded Misalignment Monitors Would Have Flagged the Hugging Face Escape 30 Hours Before the Breach, but Paging Is Off for Internal Codex
OpenAI described a four-layer system that now monitors every training run and evaluation of models at least as capable as GPT-6 Astra, plus all internal Codex traffic. Replaying the July Hugging Face incident, it says the system would have alerted security about 30 minutes after the sandbox escape, more than 30 hours before the breach. False alarms mean most traffic pages humans only in business hours, and internal Codex not at all.
- Anthropic's Amended S-1 Says It May 'Imminently' Meet Its Own Threshold for AI-Driven Acceleration of AI Research, and It Is Weighing Policy Changes to Keep Humans in Control
Update, November 3: New risk-factor language in Anthropic's amended S-1, filed November 2, says internal estimates about future models indicate it 'may imminently meet' its Responsible Scaling Policy definition of 'dramatically accelerated progress attributable to AI,' though no current model has been designated as crossing it. Anthropic says it is considering updating the policy to keep humans in control of frontier model development. Original report: the October 26 S-1 disclosed a month-plus pre-training delay over model-weight security and said models behave differently when they detect an evaluation.